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Abstract
Military coup d’état displace civilian regimes in the name of cleaning up, but such actions can also
challenge the coherence of the military by undermining the recognition of governing institutions. The
decision  of  military  regimes  to  relinquish  power  from a  position  of  strength  and  move  towards
democracy  is  conditioned by  a  number  of  factors,  requiring  the  leader  to  navigate  between the
perceived need to maintain political order and military professionalism. This paper considers regime
change in Ecuador and Niger as cases of conversion, where elites were able to maintain control in
the face of relatively weak organised opposition.  The aims of  the paper are to (1) determine the
factors that can initiate democratisation of military regimes and (2) identify the role of leaders in
shaping the process. It is argued that the relative durability of the subsequent regime is determined by
the ability of the outgoing military regime to find suitable opposition to maintain order and resist the
temptation to return to politics. 
Introduction
The seizure of power by the military has a long history and continues to play an important
role in shaping politics around the globe. The decision of the military to involve itself in
politics  derives  from  a  number  of  different  justifications,  from  cleaning  up  democratic
failings  through to protecting or  enhancing the military as an institution (Gandhi,  2008).
States  have  sought  to  manage  this  threat  through actions  to  ‘coup proof’ themselves  by
focusing on increasing the professionalisation and diversity of the military as a corporate
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body (Makara,  2013;  Pilster  and Böhmelt,  2012).  The corporate  interests  of  the  military
contain within them tensions that will generally lead to a decision in time to remove itself
from the governance of the state (Brooker, 2000). However, tension between the desires to
maintain corporate form while also being wary of reinstating previously ineffective civilian
leadership can complicate this withdrawal where the military is in a position of strength and
not removed against its will (see Tzortzis, 2016).
When dealing with the clash of interests experienced by the military a strategy of staged or
managed democratisation is often seen as a viable means of extraction while ensuring order.
This form of controlled democratisation has been an important form of transition involving
military regimes, as it ensures that the institution is protected from immediate repercussions
and also ensures some degree of stability. In Portugal in 1974 a coup d’état was staged by
junior officers to remove an authoritarian regime in order to end damaging foreign wars and
reassert a corporate identity (Bermeo, 2007, see also Accornero, 2013; Olivas Osuna, 2014).
By contrast, the contemporary move towards democratisation in Myanmar has been closely
managed and controlled by an entrenched military elite seeking to maintain some degree of
direct  control  after  regime  change  (Bünte,  2014;  Croissant  and  Kamerling,  2013).  The
decision of the military elite to move towards democracy does not come without potential
costs, even where the process can be controlled in the short to medium term. The threat of
potential repercussions therefore raises the issue of what leads to a military regime to take the
decision to democratise and who determines this.
To  assess  the  motivation  and  form  of  the  decision  to  move  from  military  regime  to
democracy this paper examines regime changes in Ecuador (1979) and Niger (1992). These
two  countries  underwent  a  process  of  democratisation  in  which  the  military  sought  to
maintain  some  degree  of  control  over  the  shape  of  the  emerging  political  system  that
developed (see Guo and Stradiotto,  2014).  The military regimes concerned were both in
power for at least a decade and had developed forms of institutional control over the political
system that provided them with a sufficiently stable base from which to oversee the transition
towards democracy. The underlying pressures the regimes faced was slightly different, but in
both cases the most effective means of dealing with these pressures was seen to involve the
extraction of the military from power. Comparing the respective decision to relinquish power
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and the subsequent trajectories can generate insights about the factors that motivate such
actions when acting from a position of relative strength.
The hierarchical character of the military regime form means that the wishes of the leader
will feature strongly in any decision, even where pressure for change is emerging within the
regime and society more generally. This paper considers the actions of the military leaders in
Ecuador and Niger in initiating and managing the transition process to determine how these
actions  shaped  the  trajectory  of  change.  Drawing  on  the  analysis  the  paper  aims  to  (1)
determine the factors that initiated democratisation of the regimes and (2) identify the role of
the leader in shaping the process. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first section
the literature on military regimes is  examined, outlining the core institutional factors and
issues of durability in the face of pressures for change. The second section builds on this
framework by outlining the  characteristics  of  political  leadership in  democratic  and non-
democratic regimes. Section three introduces the two cases, outlining the character of the
regime, the transition and the actions of the incumbent leader. Finally, the paper draws out the
key features from the cases and considers these in light of the literatures on military regimes
and  political  leadership  to  draw  conclusions  about  the  character  of  controlled
democratisations from military regimes.
Military Regimes and Democratisation
Military regimes have proliferated throughout history and have distinct characteristics that
mark them out as unique. Considering the non-democratic form, Gandhi (2008:7) argues that
the common characteristic is the achievement of ‘power by means other than competitive
elections.’ The military’s decision to seize power is often justified on the basis of failure by
the current regime, with the military taking on the role of restoring order (Feaver,  1999;
Sundhaussen, 1998). This initial goal that leads to the military seizing power suggests that
they will be ready to hand over power once stability has been achieved and return to the
barracks. While it is the case that Military regimes tend to be shorter in duration (compared to
personalist and party types) this does not necessarily ensure stability, as the armed forces may
come to see involvement in politics as a viable option. In order to understand the willingness
and ability of a military regime to democratise it is necessary to consider the regime type and
the possible pathways to democracy.
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The motivations of the military as an institution are central in determining the decision to
engage  in  politics.  Huntington  (1964)  referred  to  concept  of  military  professionalism to
encapsulate the interests of the military as a corporate entity specialising in the management
of violence to protect the state from external threats.1 This external focus means that the
military as an institution is apolitical (or above politics) and does not concern itself with the
running of the state. Drawing on developments in Latin America to challenge this position,
Stepan (1973; 1978) argued that where the domestic environment is perceived to be unstable
a  new form of  military professionalism could  emerge.  Central  to  this  progression  is  the
education  of  military  forces  in  broader  issues  of  domestic  governance  and  economics
(Stepan, 1973). More recently, Gandhi (2008: 28-9) has argued that:
Unforseen by the civilian elites who advocated military professionalization, however,  was
that the creation of an autonomous military above civilian parties provided it with the means
to intervene in its own politics.
The risk of military professionalisation in this sense is that it can develop a corporate identity
that is at odds with its role as provider of security of the state and see its interests more
directly tied to the governance of that state. 
Once the military has seized power, three key forms have been identified: ruler, guardian and
moderator (see Table 1) (Nordlinger, 1977). Brooker (2000: 48) notes that these types are
determined  by  ‘a  combination  of  two  variables:  (a)  the  extent  of  a  regime’s
political/economic objectives and goals, and (b) the extent of government power wielded by
the military.’ The ruler type rates highly on both measures, as the regime has the power and
desire to maintain control of the regime and is less inclined to relinquish power until the goal
has  been  achieved.  This  position  is  more  in  line  with  the  adoption  of  new  military
professionalism, as the range of objectives and goals increases, aligning the military more
closely with the role of government. Guardian and moderator types, by contrast, have less
1
 Friesendorf (2011) identifies the challenge posed by the police in turn adopting more militarised roles.
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interest in achieving specific goals and more in maintaining order and stability, making them
less durable in the longer-term.
Table 1 – Levels of Military Intervention
Moderators Guardians Rulers
Extent of 
Power
Veto power Governmental control Regime dominance
Political and 
Economic 
Objectives
Preserve status 
quo
Preserve status quo and/or 
correct malpractices and 
deficiencies
Effect political change and 
sometimes socioeconomic 
change
Source: Nordlinger (1977: 22).
The  specific  characteristics  of  the  military  regime  under  consideration  will  do  much  to
determine how it operates. In determining the extent of power the regime has it is necessary
to consider the form of the corporate body and the shape of the governing elite.  Gandhi
(2008: 75) notes that the core of the issue facing such regimes whereby ‘military dictators
must neutralize the threats posed by their closest colleagues and harness their cooperation to
govern.’ In the absence of democratic practices the regime is forced to rely on exertion of
control and reliance on corporate identity. Frantz and Stein (2012: 298) argue that in this
regard:
Military leaders typically govern the country in a hierarchical manner similar to how they
manage the military itself. The governing junta generally respects long-standing internal rules
and  protocols  of  the  military  and  also  adheres  to  military  guidelines  for  determining
promotions.
This reliance on and respect for formalised structures provides some degree of certainty in the
organisation of the regime and those seeking to understand its practices, reducing internal
conflicts and redressing the instability military regimes claim to address.
Where the military hierarchy is undermined by corruption or excessive patronage the ability
of the ruling elite to maintain internal cohesion will be reduced. The 1974 coup d’état in
Portugal  is  identified  as  a  classic  example,  as  junior  officers  rebelled  over  the  costs  of
continued involvement in colonial wars (Bermeo, 2007). The loss of corporate identity can
lead to degradation of the regime into personalist rule. The character of the military regime
has important implications for processes of democratisation. Personalist regimes are more
difficult to dislodge, as the costs are higher for those involved, as there is a closer and more
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direct identification with the non-democratic regime (Brooker, 2000). At the other end of the
spectrum, Linz and Stepan (1996: 66-7) argue that:
All  hierarchical  military regimes  share  one  characteristic  that  is  potentially  favorable  to
democratic transition. The officer corps, taken as a whole, sees itself as a permanent part of
the  state  apparatus,  with  enduring  interests  and  permanent  functions  that  transcend  the
interests of the government of the day.
In democratic transitions involving military regimes the corporate nature of the underlying
institution means that such regimes,  personalised or hierarchical,  will  seek to dictate and
control the process. Their ability to do so will be determined by the extent of their power
(Table 1) and the ability to manage opposition from within society.
The decision to democratise can be driven by pressure from below or it can be dictated and
managed  from above  (see  della  Porta,  2013;  Guo  and  Stradiotto,  2014).  In  some cases,
democratisation may emerge as a by-product of attempts by the regime to deal with other
internal problems (Rustow, 1970). Concerning military regimes,  those in power primarily
drive democratisation and in the absence of regime collapse or overthrow the military as an
institution is able to ‘negotiate their withdrawal on terms where they retain nondemocratic
prerogatives or impose very confining conditions’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 67). Where the
governing  regime  has  a  high  degree  of  power  these  controls  can  be  more  extensive,
potentially limiting the pace or even likelihood of full democracy emerging. Acting as ruler
or guardian type, the military will seek to ensure order and stability continues following its
withdrawal  from power.  Alternately,  the  military elites  may seek  to  maintain  control  by
shedding  the  uniform while  remaining  in  power,  through  democratic  or  non-democratic
means (Gandhi, 2008).
Democratisation is a process entailing significant uncertainty, leading in the case of military
regimes to attempts to ensure continued influence to ensure stability. Within the process of
democratisation  three  broad  stages  have  been  identified,  involving  liberalisation  of  non-
democratic rule, regime transition, and consolidation of a new political order (see Linz and
Stepan, 1996; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Shin, 1994). Initiation of the process does not
preclude freezing in a semi-democratic form or even reversion (see McFaul, 2002; Bogaards,
2009) and initial openings may soon be closed in the face of uncertainty (see for example
Deng, 2011). The cases considered in this paper all engaged in some degree of liberalisation
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and then attempt to manage the transition from military rule.  However,  their  experiences
diverged following the regime change. In order to understand the respective trajectories it is
necessary to consider the decisions taken by the ruling elites in each country and how these
were shaped by their domestic context.
Leadership in Non-Democratic and Democratising Regimes
The  role  of  the  leader  in  a  military  regime  is  determined  by the  institutional  structure,
whereas the factors governing leaders in democratising regimes are more fluid. While this
may provide  some certainty for  the  military regime,  the  base  on which  their  position  is
grounded may be less stable than at first appears. Discussing this point, Cronin (1993: 13
emphasis  in  original)  pointed  to  the  distinction  between  power  and  authority  where  the
former refers to ‘strength or raw force to coerce or force someone to do something, while
authority is the power that is accepted as legitimate by subordinates.’ This central distinction
defines the limits  to how a non-democratic regime can exercise control and points to the
potential  inherent  weakness  that  such leaders  face.  The lack  of  accurate  mechanisms for
recognising and acting on positive and negative feedback limits opportunities for incremental
adjustments to ensure continued stability and release of internal pressure (see Weaver, 2010).
In the absence of these mechanisms for gauging the degree of acceptance of their rule by
subordinates and within society military leaders can become increasingly isolated and reliant
on the direct exercise of power to maintain control.
As noted above the intervention of a military regime will be justified on a number of bases,
but  a  common claim is  the need to  ensure effective  governance following the  failure of
civilian regimes. This overall justification also disguises the fact that ‘the military has its own
institutional  or  corporatist  interests  that  include  the  establishment  of  autonomy  and  the
amassment of resources.’ (Gandhi, 2008: 28-9) Although the regime may be governed in the
name of the military and in the interests of the state, decision-making power will be located
within a small group (junta) or concentrated in the hands of an individual leader. This makes
it necessary to consider the constraints that leaders face in governing. Considering broader
forms of leadership, Burns (1978: 433) identified ‘motivation, value and purpose’ as being
central to understanding the actions taken by leaders. In the case of the military regime it is
crucial to determine whether the view of the leader or junta on these factors align with those
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of  the  wider  corporate  body.  Where  there  is  alignment,  the  leader  will  be  more  able  to
exercise control and ensure the loyalty and support of the institution, something that will not
be possible in cases where the leader is out of alignment with the corporate interest.
Structural factors shape the decisions individual leaders as actors within the system are able
to make. A military leader relies on hierarchical structures, so the leader governs by right of
their  position.  Moving  towards  democratisation  introduces  uncertainty  that  may  threaten
other actors within the hierarchy, while also empowering those outside. Such an approach
requires the leader to achieve a balance ‘as leaders must be willing and able to run the risk of
mobilising their own constituency and the risk of accepting compromises’ (Pasquino, 1990:
126). In the case of military regimes, the leader must balance the corporate needs of the
military with those of the contending forces within society. As Tzortzis (2016) has recently
argued with regard to democratisation in Greece and Spain, that the actions and decisions of
the leaders were crucial in the respective failure and success of controlled democratisation. In
both cases leaders were required to counter factions within the military while at the same
time attempting satisfy demands and expectations from emerging opposition parties.
 
Taken together, these factors suggest that military regimes that have the capacity to do so will
seek to control the democratisation process as a means of ensuring stability. Although there
may be a move towards democratisation this may not be the initial motivation, meaning that
there is an inherent tension given the desire for stability noted above. In this process the
actions of the leader will be central in determining whether the democratisation is sustainable
and  maintained.  Returning  to  issues  of  continuity,  the  persistence  of  a  leader  from the
outgoing regime can contribute to stability and enable decisions to be based on longer-term
considerations (see O’Brien, 2007; 2010; 2016). Hite and Morlino (2004) argue that values,
institutions and behaviours from the non-democratic period will continue to cast a shadow
over the democratising system. These legacies may be enhanced where a non-democratic
leader continues to govern the political regime. In the case of military regimes it is important
to consider the unity and support of the armed forces in accepting the new order, which may
be undermined where civilian leaders are appointed or where military leaders take actions
that appear to threaten the interests of the military as a corporate body. As Tzortzis (2016) has
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noted, even the paradigmatic Spanish transition saw military threat for several years after the
regime change was initiated, embodied in the failed 1981 coup (see also Olivas Osuna, 2014).
Military Governance in Ecuador and Niger
The military regimes in Ecuador and Niger shared a number of similarities, although they
emerged in different contexts. In both cases strong leaders emerged and took control of the
regime, subduing the role of the military in governing to their own personal will. Actions
taken to centralise power in this way lay at the core of the eventual decision to relinquish
power and return to civilian rule. The cases have been selected due to their classification as
cases of controlled democratisation (or conversion as identified by Guo and Stradiotto, 2014).
This form of regime change sees the military maintain a degree of control over the transition
to civilian governance,  often for a period of time following the official  withdrawal.  It  is
important to consider the role of the leadership of such regimes in order to understand the
reasons why they would be willing to transfer power in this way.
On February 15 1972, General  Guillermo Rodríguez Lara initiated a coup in Ecuador to
remove the incumbent civilian regime. The reasons given for the intervention place the new
regime clearly in the ruler category as Rodríguez Lara stated 'There would be no temporary
interventions  just  in  order  to  turn  power  over  to  the  same old  politicians,  the  same old
parties... This time it would be to totally transform the entire country.' (cited in Schodt, 1987:
88-9) The ambition was to undertake reforms that broke the dominance of the agrarian elite
and capitalise on oil revenues in order to promote domestic development. In contrast to the
1963-66 military junta, which had acted to forestall a communist threat, the Rodríguez Lara
reigme justified its intervention on the need for deeper structural reforms that could address
the failings of the civilian regime that had preceeded it (Isaacs, 1993).
In Niger, the military entered politics on April 15 1974 following civil unrest and the failure
of the government to ensure stability. The regime was led the the Conseil Militaire Suprême
(CMS)  'a  shadowy  group  of  twelve  military  officers  led  by  Lt.  Col  Senyi  Kountché'
(Charlick, 1991: 62). Although the regime did not express the same far-reaching goals as that
of  the  Ecuadorian  regime,  the  extent  of  the  famine  and  political  discontent  provided an
opportunity for a similar level of engagement in politics (Moestrup, 1999). Kountché moved
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quickly to establish control and position himself as ruler, a position he held with little direct
challenge until  his  death in  1987.  Following his death Ali  Saibou was appointed interim
president and was able to consolidate this position and hold it until 1993 when the first free
presidential elections were held (see Robinson, 1994).
Having gained power both Rodríguez Lara and Kountché (continued by Saibou) established
personalist styles of rule, sidelining and controlling the military as an institution. Rodríguez
Lara gained control at the expense of the  Consejo Supremo de Gobierno (CSG) within six
months  of  gaining  power  (Isaacs,  1993).  Establishment  of  a  personalist  form  of  rule
contributed  to  factionalisation  within  the  military and came increasingly under  fire  from
excluded political  leaders,  the  private  sector  and labour  organisations  (Schodt,  1987).  In
Niger, Kountché was more successful in establishing a stable personalist base 'balancing the
interests of the military and, to a lesser extent, those of the civilian bureaucracy with his own
interest in maintaining centralized, tight, highly personal control.' (Charlick, 1987: 64) Both
leaders also used repression to address and stifle dissent (see Charlick, 1987; Isaacs, 1993).
Saibou followed Kountché's lead, while also reducing the degree of repression and seeking to
encourage mass mobilisation to show support for the regime (Charlick, 1987).
Personalisation  of  the  regimes  can  be  seen  as  a  symptom  of  low  levels  of  military
professionalism, as the leaders were able to circumvent corporate structures to pursue their
personal  interests.  Isaacs  (1993:  102)  argues  that  in  the  case  of  Ecuador  the  'absence of
advanced training...prevented the emergence of a coherent set of corporate values.' While this
lack of corporateness enabled the leaders to control the military, it also introduced an element
of  uncertainty,  as  hierarchical  roles  were disattended.  In Niger  under  Kountché,  Charlick
(1987)  notes  that  attempted  coups  took place  every couple  of  years.  Both  countries  had
established institutional bodies to govern (CSG and CMS) but these were sidelined in favour
of the interests of the leader. Failure to cultivate military professionalism also undermined the
ability to rely on the loyalty of the institution, as Rodríguez Lara discovered when he was
overthrown by coup in 1976.
The  performance  of  the  regimes  in  the  two  countries  followed  broadly  similar  overall
trajectories. The discovery of oil in Ecuador in 1967 and uranium in Niger enabled both to
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initially generate legitimacy in the eyes of the population by increasing public spending and
reducing the level of political instability. In Ecuador the regime used oil resources to promote
land reform and modernise the economy (Avilés. 2009). Despite the opportunity presented by
oil, the minimal levels of foreign participation in the industry from 1974 meant that exports
collapsed and the regime was forced to find other ways to encourage production in the face of
growing  economic  and  social  instability  (Brogan,  1984).  Niger  also  relied  on  resource
exploitation, with public spending rising by 185% between 1976 and 1980, at which point
uranium represented 75% of state revenues (Gazibo, 2995: 75). Following global recession
and collapse in uranium prices the regime was forced to turn to the IMF, leading to growing
discontent within the population, which peaked in 1989 (Gazibo, 2005). The inability of both
regimes to live up to the promises they had made on seizing power sowed the seeds for their
eventual decision to relinquish power.
The ways in which the regimes initiated the process of democratisation varied, but arguably
derived from their perceived failings. Rodríguez Lara was removed by a coup that brought
together hardliners and softliners and quickly renounced the reformist agenda with the stated
intention  of  returning  power  to  civilians  (Schodt,  1987).  An  important  motivation  was
identified as Rodríguez Lara's actions to concentrate power in his hands, at the expense of the
military  as  an  institution  (Isaacs,  1993).  In  Niger,  Saibou moved  to  reform the  political
system  by  creating  a  new  national  party  in  1988  and  holding  elections  for  a  National
Assembly the following year (Charlick, 1991). Charlick (1991: 76) argues that rather than
demonstrating a commitment to democratisation, these moves reflected a consistent pattern in
Nigerien politics which involved a 'struggle to build a strong bureaucratic-authoritarian state
apparatus, the failure to achieve this goal and the ascendancy of personal rule, the realization
of  the  limits  of  personal  rule  and  subsequent  efforts  to  supplement  it  through  populist
mobilization.'
The result in both cases was an attempt to move towards some form of civilian rule, under the
tutelage of the outgoing regime.  The Ecuadorian regime was shaken by the victory of  a
centre-left ticket in the first round of the presidential elections, leading to 'political tension
orchestrated by conservatives' and a failed attempt by right-wing officers to topple the junta
in  September  1978 (Brogan,  1984:  18).  As Isaacs  (1993) notes,  attempts  by the  military
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regime  failed  as  the  retorno escaped  its  control.  Ali  Saibou  also  attempted  to  maintain
control. While a constitutional referendum in September 1989 officially ended military rule,
Robinson (1994:  598)  notes  that  it  also 'created a  presidential  regime,  institutionalized a
political role for the military, [and] established the Mouvement National pour la Societe de
Development  (MNSD) as  the sole  legal  party'.  Faced with the continuation of  rebranded
authoritarian  rule,  trade  unions  and  students  engaged  in  sustained  opposition,  eventually
forcing Saibou to agree to a national conference in July 1991 to negotiate terms of transition
to multipartism (Robinson, 1994). The outcome was a transitional government that drafted a
new constitution 'introducing a semi-presidential regime, on 26 December 1992. Elections for
the national  assembly and two rounds of presidential  elections followed in February and
March 1993' (Moestrup, 1999: 178-9) bringing an end to the regime.
Democratisation of Ruler Type Military Regimes
The military regimes in Ecuador and Niger both clearly align with Nordlinger's ruler-type
regime. They faced little direct opposition to their rule and were able to act with relative
impunity  on  coming  to  power.  The  leadership  of  these  regimes  sought  to  bring  about
sweeping changes to what they perceived to be dysfunctional political systems by introducing
social and economic reforms (including those governing land tenure). Despite their apparent
strength  and  desire  to  remain  in  power  the  leaders  involved  were  eventually  forced  to
relinquish power due to growing external demands and internal divisions. Although it has
been argued that  military regimes remain in  power for  shorter  periods of  time (Brooker,
2000), these two cases reinforce the point that this is not necessarily by choice. 
The first point to note about the regimes is that the leaders that sought to maintain control
(Rodríguez Lara,  Kountché and Saibou) did so by centralising and personalising power in
their hands (see Gandhi, 2008). This clashes with the general trend of military regimes to
govern  through  established  guidelines  (Frantz  and  Stein,  2012).  Lower  levels  of
professionalisation  in  both  cases  meant  that  the  internal  hierarchy  of  the  military  as  a
corporate body was easier to bypass. The coup against Rodríguez Lara can be seen as an
attempt by the military to reassert the control as an institution, whereas Saibou's attempted to
pre-empt this threat by removing the military from a governing position. The decision of the
leaders to move undermine the military hierarchy and corporate practices weakened their
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base  left  them  exposed.2 It  also  meant  that  the  military  suffered  reputational  damage
following the democratisation, with the resulting degree of control in the post-authoritarian
period being less than had been anticipated.
The ability of leaders to remain in power was also linked to the performance of the regime.
As  Brooker  (2000)  has  argued,  the  lack  of  accountability  to  the  public  means  that
authoritarian regimes must find another base from which to generate legitimacy (see also
Frantz and Stein, 2012). Both regimes were able to draw on natural resources to generate
income for  the state,  but  as  external  conditions  changed and prices fell  they had limited
options. Turning to external lenders (such as the IMF) further weakened the legitimacy they
did have and led to a reliance on repressive measures to quell discontent. Ali Saibou was able
to temporarily forestall  opposition by reducing levels of repression,  as was the junta that
dislodged Rodríguez Lara.  In both cases this  proved short-lived,  as limited steps towards
liberalisation were not sufficient to address the demands of the external opposition.
Table 2 – Regime Type and Mode of Transition (1975-1999)
Mode of Transition
Conversion Cooperative Collapse
Foreign
Intervention
Regime Type
Military 11 3 8 1
Party* 6 5 3 1
Communist+ 4 6 1 0
Personalist 2 2 0 0
Notes: * ‘Party’ includes ‘One Party’ and ‘Electoral’; + ‘Communist’ excludes former Soviet 
Republics, FYR and Slovakia 
Source: Guo and Stradiotto (2014) and Kailitz (2013)
Examining both cases and their moves towards democracy it is clear that the classification of
controlled  democratisation  (or  conversion)  is  appropriate.  Neither  of  the  regimes
democratised willingly, instead being forced to change due to growing pressure from below
and internal tensions. The desire to maintain control during the democratisation process can
be linked to the attempt to protect the military from retribution and also to guard against
problems identified in previous civilian regimes (see Linz and Stepan, 1996). As Guo and2 The actions of President Boris Yeltsin to neglect the formal institutions of government in favour of an 
informal led to a similar exposure and inability to rely on formal authority (see O'Brien, 2007).
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Stradiotto (2014) note (Table 2) mlitary regimes are reluctant to relinquish power through
negotiation between equal parties and instead are more likely to hold out and face collapse if
they are unable to exercise some degree of control. 
Conclusion
The  threat  and  reality  of  military  intervention  in  politics  has  been  observed  throughout
history, following peaks and troughs. A central driver has often been the failure of civilian
governance and the perceived need to  clean up. Acting as a  corporate body,  the military
possesse the tools and capability to dislodge civilian regimes. However, the costs of doing so
are often high, as the military suffers internal divisions and reputational damage. As Linz and
Stepan (1996) note, the military remains part of the apparatus of the state, so must keep an
eye to its future viability. Within these regimes, the role of the leader is key in determining
the  form  of  governance  that  emerges.  Ruler-type  military  regimes  require  significant
institutional  order  and  capacity  to  sustain  themselves  in  power,  as  well  as  support  or
quiescence  of  the  population,  something  that  is  likely  to  decrease  over  time  if  formal
hierarchies are disattended in favour of informal relations.
The two cases examined in this  paper  illustrate  the costs  for the military of engaging in
politics. They also demonstrate the result of less professionalised institutions seizing power.
More personalised forms of rule  in Ecuador and Niger resulted in a  breakdown of order
within  the  military as  an  institution,  as  dmonstrated by the  coup attempts  staged against
Kountché and Rodríguez Lara. Both cases also illustrate the difficulty in maintaining a ruler-
type regime when military order and structure are subverted in the interests of the leader.
Democratisation  came  as  a  result  of  building  external  pressure  during  periods  of
liberalisation. These actions were undertaken in an attempt to re-establish the legitimacy of
the regime among the general population, in an attempt to move to civilian one-party rule in
Niger and a form of managed return to tutelary civilian governance under the Ecuadorian
junta. However, having moved away from the corporate ideals of the military, the outgoing
regimes struggled to impose control over the form and nature of the regime that succeeded
them.
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